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Corporate Governance Reforms Around the World: The Effect on 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Abstract 
This study examines the effect of major corporate governance reforms on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in countries around the world. Using a difference-in-differences design, 
we find robust evidence that worldwide corporate governance reforms result in an increase in 
CSR performance in both the environmental and social dimensions. Relative to countries with 
comply-or-explain reforms, countries with rule-based reforms tend to experience a greater 
increase in CSR performance post-reform. In addition, the effect of reforms on CSR 
performance is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership or 
lower levels of insider ownership and in countries with weaker CSR awareness and a more 
stringent legal and regulatory environment. Further analyses show that the reforms strengthen 
the relation between CSR and future financial performance. Collectively, our evidence suggests 
that increases in substantive CSR investment represent a potential channel through which 
corporate governance reforms can increase shareholder value and that the effectiveness of 
reforms varies with both firm- and country-level characteristics related to the relative influence 
of external shareholders. 
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1. Introduction 
A key objective of corporate governance reform is to overcome frictions preventing firms 
from investing in good corporate governance practices that can increase long-term shareholder 
value by improving board oversight and corporate transparency (e.g., Kim and Liu 2013; 
Fauver et al. 2017). As a result, during the last two decades, a number of countries have 
undertaken corporate governance reforms in an attempt to strengthen the mechanisms through 
which shareholders ensure a financial return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
While approaches to reform vary among countries, most reforms focus on board-related 
practices, such as imposing greater board independence, promoting audit committee and 
auditor independence, and separating the positions of chairman and chief executive officer 
(CEO). Supporting the importance and effectiveness of such reforms, recent studies have 
documented that major corporate governance reforms implemented in many countries since the 
late 1990s increased shareholder wealth (e.g., Fauver et al. 2017). 
Corporate performance in environmental and social dimensions (hereafter, corporate 
social responsibility [CSR] performance) is a critical issue globally and is at the forefront of 
corporate governance concerns for many firms.1 Indeed, an increasing number of investors are 
integrating CSR into their investment decisions due to both financial and social considerations, 
thereby making investors a major driving force behind firms’ CSR performance (Dyck et al. 
2019). Following the stakeholder view that CSR represents an important tool for long-term 
shareholder value creation (e.g., Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Ferrell et al. 2016; El Ghoul et al. 
2017; Lins et al. 2017), investors are likely to exert greater influence on improving CSR 
policies with the objective of enhancing long-term shareholder value due to strengthened 
governance practices following a country’s corporate governance reform. Alternatively, 
                                               
1  See “2019 Global & Regional Trends in Corporate Governance,” available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/30/2019-global-regional-trends-in-corporate-governance/.  
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although CSR has become an important business practice in recent years, opponents hold the 
view that it can be a manifestation of agency cost with the potential to hamper shareholder 
value (e.g., Friedman 1970; Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Krüger 2015; Cheng et al. 2016).2 Based 
on this perspective, improved board oversights and monitoring resulted by strengthened 
corporate governance practices would presumably reduce firms’ CSR investment resulting 
from agency problems. These discussions suggest that the ultimate effect of corporate 
governance reforms on CSR is an empirical question. 
 Given the presence of endogeneity concerns in examining the relation between corporate 
governance and CSR (Jamali et al. 2008; Harjoto and Jo 2011; Jo and Harjoto 2012; Ferrell et 
al. 2016), we take advantage of a quasi-experimental opportunity provided by the world wide 
adoption of corporate governance reforms to examine (1) whether and how major corporate 
governance reforms in a country affect firms’ CSR performance and (2) whether and how the 
effect of reforms on firms’ CSR performance varies with cross-sectional differences across 
reform-, firm-, and country-level characteristics. Examining the effect of corporate governance 
in a multi-country context also offers other advantages. For example, given that the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms likely varies with other country-level 
institutions (La Porta et al. 1988), an international study can shed light on how corporate 
governance interacts with other formal institutions in influencing managerial behavior. 
To test whether reforms affect firms’ CSR performance, we use data from Thomson 
Reuters ASSET4 to construct firm-level CSR performance measures. Based on a large sample 
of more than 20,000 observations from 34 countries during the 2002 to 2011 period with firms’ 
CSR performance data available, we examine changes in firms’ CSR performance following a 
country’s implementation of major corporate governance reforms. Using a difference-in-
                                               
2 See, for example, Kitzmueller and Shumshack (2012) and Radhakrishnan et al. (2018) for a review of the CSR 
literature.  
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indifferences (DID) research design allows us to make a stronger inference about the causal 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR performance. We find that on average, 
firms’ CSR performance improves following reforms. Our results hold for different types of 
reforms (including reforms focusing on the improvement of board independence, enhancing 
audit committee and auditor independence, and encouraging the separation of the chairman and 
CEO roles) and across different dimensions of CSR performance (either the environmental or 
social dimension). 
In addition, we find that the positive effect of reforms on CSR is stronger in countries 
with rule-based reforms and in countries with lower levels of CSR awareness. Additional 
results suggest that reforms have a greater effect on CSR performance in countries with a more 
stringent legal and regulatory environment. Finally, consistent with the literature showing the 
importance of CSR performance to shareholder wealth (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Lins et al. 
2017; Dyck et al. 2019), we find that the effect of reforms on CSR performance is more 
pronounced for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership or lower levels of insider 
ownership. 
While the above findings lend support to the argument that corporate governance reforms 
have a positive effect on firms’ CSR performance, the findings do not speak to the question of 
whether the improved CSR performance post-reform enhances shareholder value. That is, 
managers’ improvement in CSR performance could be a signal of agency problems (Masulis 
and Reza 2015; Cheng et al. 2016; Cronqvist and Yu 2017) or could come from the pressure 
of outside directors who pay more attention to corporate responsibility than economic 
performance (Ibrahim and Angelidis 1995; Post et al. 2011). Thus, we next explore whether 
and how reforms affect the relation between CSR performance and future financial 
performance. Our results indicate that relative to firms domiciled in countries without reforms 
implemented during the same period, firms domiciled in countries with reforms implemented 
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during our sample period tend to subsequently experience a strengthened relation between CSR 
performance and future financial performance. This finding is consistent with the view that 
increased CSR performance in period post the reforms is perceived as value-enhancing by 
shareholders. 
We conduct several additional tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. For example, 
we require a firm to appear for at least one year in both the pre- and post-reform periods and 
use a constant sample to explore the effect of reforms on CSR performance. We use an 
alternative DID specification by benchmarking each of our treatment firms (i.e., firms 
domiciled in countries with reforms implemented during our sample period) with a control firm 
selected using the propensity score matching (PSM) methodology from countries without 
reforms implemented during the same period (or from the U.K. because the U.K. was the first 
country to implement corporate governance reforms among our sample countries) for better 
comparison. To reduce the concern that changes in correlated omitted variables may drive our 
results, we also include variables controlling for the strength of firm-level corporate 
governance and time trend. Our results are qualitatively similar in all of these additional tests. 
Next, using a dynamic research design, we find a statistically significant effect of reforms 
on CSR as early as from the beginning of the second year post-reform and such effect tends to 
last thereafter. We further assess the validity of the parallel trend assumption underlying the 
DID method by conducting a placebo test using different pseudo reform years during both the 
pre- and post-reform periods. We find no evidence of changes in CSR performance subsequent 
to pseudo reform years. Finally, we examine whether and to what extent the implementation 
of corporate governance reform affects firms’ CSR reporting practices measured by the 
likelihood of (1) issuing a standalone CSR report, (2) preparing a CSR report in accordance 
with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines, (3) providing external assurance to 
signal the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of the CSR disclosure, and (4) integrating 
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CSR information on financial reports. However, in all of these tests, we do not find evidence 
suggesting that relative to managers in countries without reforms, managers in countries with 
reforms alter their CSR reporting practices during the post-reform period. 
Taken together, our findings support the positive role played by a country’s 
implementation of corporate governance reforms in fostering firms’ substantive CSR 
performance. The finding of a stronger positive association between CSR performance and 
firms’ future financial performance in the post-reform period lends further support to the value-
enhancing view of CSR activities (Boubakri et al. 2016; El Ghoul et al. 2017). To sum up, our 
evidence suggests that the strengthened corporate governance practices with the goal of 
enhancing shareholders’ value create a positive externality effect on the performance towards 
stakeholders. Moreover, the increases in substantive CSR investment represent a potential 
channel through which corporate governance reforms can increase shareholder value as 
documented by prior studies. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the literature documents that 
nation-level institutional factors (such as culture and investor protection) have significant 
effects on shaping firms’ CSR practices as well as their perceived value to investors (van der 
Laan Smith et al. 2005, 2010; Orij 2010; Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; Boubakri et al. 2016; 
Cahan et al. 2016; El Ghoul et al. 2017). For example, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) find that 
firms’ CSR performance is significantly related to the country’s political system, educational 
system, and cultural system. Other studies find that countries characterized by a stakeholder 
orientation promote higher CSR engagement (van der Laan Smith et al. 2005; Orij 2010; Cahan 
et al. 2016). This paper documents that country-level corporate governance reforms not only 
play an important role in determining firms’ CSR performance, but also on the effect of CSR 
performance on firm value. Thus, we add to the literature examining the cross-country 
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differences in CSR initiatives and contribute to the general literature studying determinants and 
consequences of CSR performance. 
Second, the literature investigating the role of governance in influencing socially 
responsible firm behavior has thus far produced contradictory results (Coffey and Fryxell 1991; 
Waddock and Graves 1997; David et al. 2007; Jo and Harjoto 2012). A possible reason for that 
is the challenge of addressing the endogeneity between corporate governance practices and 
CSR practices. Given that a government’s adoption of corporate governance reform is likely 
exogenous to firms’ governance practices and can thus help mitigate the endogeneity concern 
commonly associated with such studies, our study uses the implementation of reform in a 
country as a quasi-natural experiment to draw a more direct causal inference on the effect of 
corporate governance on CSR performance. 
Finally, our study contributes to a growing body of literature that examines the 
consequences of corporate governance reform in a global setting. For example, Fauver et al. 
(2017) find that board reforms increase firm value, and Kim and Lu (2013) find that corporate 
governance reforms reduce the investor protection gap between acquirers and targets, which in 
turn influences foreign acquirers’ tendency to pick better performing firms in emerging markets. 
Tsang et al. (2019a) argue that a greater proportion of independent board members resulting 
from the implementation of corporate governance reforms may increase CEOs’ career concerns 
and place excessive pressure on managers’ short-term performance, reducing their incentives 
to pursue innovative projects with long-term value. Supporting this argument, they present 
evidence showing that the worldwide adoption of corporate governance reforms hinders firms’ 
future innovative outputs. Adding to this literature, our findings suggest that corporate 
governance reforms can improve firms’ CSR investment with the potential to create long-term 
shareholder value. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature 
and develops research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Data and 
sample statistics are summarized in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main empirical results 
and results of other robustness checks. Section 6 discusses additional analyses. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
The literature suggests that corporate governance reforms affect management oversight 
and firm performance (Dahya et al. 2002; Dahya and McConnell 2007; Zhang 2007; Li 2014). 
While findings based on a single country are inconclusive regarding the valuation 
consequences of firm-level governance attributes (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003), international 
studies tend to show a positive relation between governance quality and firm performance (e.g., 
Aggarwal et al. 2009; Dahya et al. 2008). Further supporting the effectiveness of corporate 
governance reforms in affecting firm performance, Fauver et al. (2017) document that major 
board reforms implemented in countries around the world increase firm value. 
The literature outlines two perspectives on CSR. The positive view of CSR posits that 
companies engage with stakeholders to enhance shareholder value. In line with this view, 
studies show that superior CSR performance is associated with greater access to external 
finance (e.g., Goss and Roberts 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2014), reduced cost of 
capital, and higher valuation (e.g., Galema et al. 2008; El Ghoul et al. 2011; Ng and Rezaee 
2015). Further supporting this view, the literature also provides examples of the mechanisms 
through which CSR performance can have a positive effect on shareholder wealth, such as 
customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and greater institutional ownership (e.g., Dowell 
et al. 2000; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Edmans 2011; Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Dimson et 
al. 2015). More recently, Lins et al. (2017) suggest that a firm’s CSR activities can be 
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considered a vehicle for building social capital, thereby protecting firm value during a period 
of financial crisis. 
The negative view of CSR, in contrast, holds that CSR signals the presence of agency 
problems in a firm (Friedman 1970). According to this line of thought, insiders (e.g., managers 
or controlling shareholders) invest in CSR activities for their own benefit, such as to enhance 
their reputation among key stakeholders at the expense of shareholders (e.g., Cespa and 
Cestone 2007; Prior et al. 2008; Barnea and Rubin 2010; Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Masulis 
and Reza 2015). Empirical studies provide evidence supporting this alternative view of CSR. 
For example, using an event study, Krüger (2015) shows that investors respond negatively to 
positive CSR news subject to a high agency problem concern. Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) 
explore the effect of CSR from analysts’ perspectives and find that analysts issue more 
pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings when they perceive firms’ CSR 
as an agency cost. 
Additionally, CSR is considered an expensive investment that can incur substantial costs 
in the near-term with uncertain financial returns in the long run (e.g., Manchiraju and Rajgopal 
2017; Chen et al. 2018). Although an extensive body of literature has studied the link between 
CSR and firm value, the ongoing debate and inconclusive evidence suggest that firms’ CSR 
investments are likely associated with uncertain future returns and thus can be perceived as a 
form of risk-taking.3 This view is further supported by the fact that firms’ CSR activities tend 
to be broad in scope (e.g., covering multiple dimensions including environment, products, 
employees, communities, etc.), different in form (e.g., proactive or reactive), and forward-
looking in nature. As a result, relative to other forms of investment, such as capital expenditures, 
                                               
3 The literature provides mixed evidence concerning the effect of CSR on financial performance (e.g., Barnett and 
Salomon 2006; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Orlitzky et al. 2003). Further, Friede et al. (2015) analyze around 
2,200 studies and conclude that there is mixed evidence on the effect of CSR on financial performance. 
  
9 
 
the financial returns of CSR tend to be more difficult to quantify as its outcomes may be more 
diffuse and uncertain (Wang et al. 2016). 
Corporate governance reforms implemented in a country are typically followed by higher 
corporate governance requirements, which presumably help align corporate insiders’ interests 
with those of shareholders.4 In this study, we posit that corporate governance reforms may 
affect CSR through various mechanisms, which can lead to contrasting expectations. The 
positive view of CSR suggests that corporate governance reforms should encourage firms’ CSR 
investment to enhance shareholder value. Consistent with this prediction, research shows that 
well-governed firms that suffer less from agency problems engage more in CSR (Harjoto and 
Jo 2011; Jo and Harjoto 2012; Ferrell et al. 2016). In addition, to the extent that corporate 
governance reforms strengthen the influence of outside board members who tend to view firms’ 
broader societal effect (even without the potential to enhance shareholder value) as more 
important (Ibrahim and Angelidis 1995; Post et al. 2011), we again predict that reforms may 
have a positive effect on CSR performance. 
There is an alternative prediction leading to a negative relationship between corporate 
governance reforms and CSR performance. As discussed above, the negative view of CSR 
argues that CSR activities represent the outcome of agency problems in the firm. If reforms 
constrain managers’ flexibility through a greater level of board oversight that prevents 
managers from investing in CSR activities for personal benefit, one would expect firms to have 
a lower level of CSR performance after the implementation of reforms. In addition, studies 
suggest that stricter corporate governance reforms could reduce managers’ risk-taking 
incentive following the reforms (e.g., Bargeron et al. 2010; Cohen and Dey 2013; Tsang et al. 
                                               
4 Studies suggest that managers tend to be risk-averse and are less willing to invest in long-term value-maximizing 
projects. However, better governance can provide incentives and mechanisms that encourage managers to take 
risks and invest in projects that benefit shareholders in the long run (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Koirala et 
al. 2018).  
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2019a). Thus, to the extent that reforms improve monitoring of corporate insiders by 
shareholders and expand the liability associated with risk-taking activities,5 managers might 
be less likely to invest in CSR initiatives, resulting in lower CSR performance post-reform. 
Based on the discussions above, we formulate competing hypotheses as follows: 
H1a: Corporate governance reforms have a positive effect on firms’ CSR performance. 
H1b: Corporate governance reforms have a negative effect on firms’ CSR performance. 
 
3. Research Design 
To test the effect of corporate governance reforms on firms’ CSR performance, we use a 
DID design by regressing firms’ CSR performance on Post, an indicator variable that captures 
the post-reform period in which corporate governance reform was adopted by a country. 
Because each country implements reform in different years, following previous studies (e.g., 
Fauver et al. 2017; Tsang et al. 2019a), we use a staggered DID research design that involves 
multiple treatment groups and time periods. Accordingly, we include both firm fixed effects 
and year fixed effects to identify the within-firm and within-year changes in CSR performance 
between treatment and control firms when countries initiate reforms. This approach implicitly 
takes as the benchmark group all firms from countries without reforms as of a particular time 
and is commonly used in the literature (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Bertrand et al. 2004).6 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regression model: 
CSR_Perf = β0 + β1Post + β2Size + β3Age+ β4RD + β5Leverage + β6Accrual + β7Competition + 
β8SalesGrowth + β9Capital + β10MB + β11Institution + β12Nmarket + β13Analyst + 
β14Big4Auditor +FirmFE + IndustryFE + YearFE + Ɛ   (1) 
                                               
5
 Given the expensive nature and uncertain future return associated with CSR activities, CSR investment can be 
considered as a risk-taking activity. 
6 As a robustness test, we also use an alternative DID specification. We discuss this research design and the 
corresponding results in Section 4. 
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in which CSR_Perf denotes CSR performance, which consists of environmental and social 
performance. We follow previous studies (e.g., Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; El Ghoul et al. 
2016) and measure a firm’s CSR performance using the average scores of all performance 
indicators in the environment (ENV_Perf) and social performance pillars (SOC_Perf). The 
value of CSR_Perf ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating better CSR performance. 
The main variable of interest is Post, which is an indicator variable that equals one if a given 
year is the year in which a country’s reform became effective or any following year and zero 
otherwise. Theoretically, this variable captures the incremental change (from pre- to post-
reform period) in the CSR performance of firms domiciled in countries with reforms 
implemented relative to the change in CSR performance of firms located in countries without 
reforms implemented during the same period. Hypothesis 1a (1b) predicts that the 
implementation of corporate governance reforms has a positive (negative) effect on firms’ CSR 
performance. Therefore, a significantly positive (negative) coefficient on Post (β1) indicates 
that Hypothesis 1a (1b) is supported. 
We include an array of control variables documented in the literature as potential 
determinants of CSR performance. Larger firms and firms with an established history have 
more resources to invest in CSR (McGuire et al. 1988; McWilliams and Siegel 2000). Thus, 
we control for firm size (Size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets) and Age 
(measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years since incorporation). RD is research 
and development expenses scaled by net sales. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
a proxy for lenders’ concerns about a firm’s risk and CSR performance (Goss and Roberts 
2011). Jiraporn et al. (2014) argue that firms with more capital expenditures have fewer 
resources to invest in CSR. Therefore, we control for capital intensity, measured by Capital 
(the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets). We control for growth opportunities (measured 
by MB, the market-to-book ratio of equity, and SalesGrowth, the annual sales growth rate) as 
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firms with higher growth opportunities may have fewer resources for CSR activities but may 
also have greater incentives to use CSR to reduce information asymmetry (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
Competition is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, computed by (-1) times the sum 
of squared market shares in the sales of a firm’s industry, with industries being defined based 
on the two-digit SIC code. We include two measures of financial reporting quality, Accrual 
and Big4Auditor, as firms with less transparent reporting can use CSR as a tool to cover up 
earnings management misconduct (Chih et al. 2008; Prior et al. 2008). Accrual is a measure of 
firm-level financial opacity measured by country-industry-year-adjusted total accruals based 
on Bhattacharya et al. (2003). Big4Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s 
auditor is a big four auditor and zero otherwise. Cross-listing (measured by Nmarket, the total 
number of stock exchanges on which a firm is listed, including its home country listing), analyst 
coverage (measured by Analyst, the number of analysts following a firm during the current 
year), and institutional ownership (measured by Institution, the proportion of shares held by all 
types of institutional investors at the end of the year) are also shown to be associated with CSR 
performance (Boubakri et al. 2016; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Finally, we include the industry, year, 
and firm fixed effects to account for variation in CSR performance that is potentially driven by 
unobserved heterogeneities across industry, year, and firm, respectively.7 
 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Data source and sample selection 
We first identify countries that have experienced major corporate governance reforms 
based on Fauver et al. (2017) and Kim and Lu (2013).8 For each reform initiative, we obtain 
information about the year in which a reform became effective, the types/objectives of the 
                                               
7 Our inferences are unchanged if, in our regressions, we cluster standard errors either by industry or by firm.  
8 Fauver et al. (2017) and Kim and Lu (2013) manually collect information on corporate governance reforms 
around the world from various sources, such as the World Bank, the European Corporate Governance Institute, 
local stock exchange regulators, and research studies. 
  
13 
 
reform involved (e.g., encouraging board independence, promoting audit committee and 
auditor independence, and separating the chairman and CEO positions), and the reform 
approach (rule-based or comply-or-explain). Detailed information about the implementation 
year, types, and approach of major reforms in each country is provided in Appendix A. 
Our sample period starts with 2002, the earliest year for which we can obtain CSR 
performance data from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG database. The advantage of the 
ASSET4 database is that it has a large number of international firms and it scores firms on 
financial, environmental, social, and governance dimensions based on objective, publicly 
available information according to Thomson Reuters (e.g., stock exchange filings, annual 
financial and sustainability reports, nongovernmental organizations’ websites, and news 
sources). The database evaluates firms’ environmental performance in terms of three 
dimensions: (1) emissions reduction, (2) resource reduction, and (3) product innovation. In 
terms of social performance, it evaluates seven dimensions: (1) employment quality, (2) health 
and safety, (3) training and development, (4) diversity and opportunity, (5) human rights, (6) 
community, and (7) product responsibility. We focus on firm performance in the environmental 
and social dimensions and use the average performance score of both dimensions as a measure 
of CSR performance. Appendix C summarizes the detailed components in the environmental 
and social dimensions defined by ASSET4. 
In our sample, all 34 countries with corporate governance reforms implemented since 
1998 are covered by ASSET4. However, because ASSET4 started to provide CSR performance 
data for a large number of global firms in 2002, to ensure the existence of at least a one-year 
pre-reform window to examine the changes in firms’ CSR performance, the reform year of our 
treatment countries starts with 2003 (three countries, France, Singapore, and the U.S., 
implemented reforms in 2003). Our sample period ends in 2011 because all of the countries in 
our sample completed their reforms by 2007. Using 2011 as the ending year ensures a sufficient 
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post-reform period to conduct the analysis. We further exclude firms from financial industries 
(SIC codes 6000-6411).9 Lastly, we exclude firm-year observations with missing data for the 
control variables, leading to a final sample of 20,293 firm-year observations associated with 
3,514 firms from 34 countries (12,343 observations from countries with reforms implemented 
since 2003 and 7,950 observations from countries with reforms implemented before 2003). 
Among the 34 sample countries, 15 countries with major corporate governance reforms 
implemented during our sample period are our treatment samples (in which 5 countries adopted 
rule-based reforms). For more detailed information about our treatment countries, please see 
Figure 1. 
4.2. Sample distribution and descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample distribution and average CSR performance by 
country. The treatment group represents countries that initiated corporate governance reforms 
during our sample period. As discussed earlier, countries that implemented reforms in year 
2002 or before do not experience any reform changes during our sample period. Thus, these 
countries are the benchmark group. Both the treatment and benchmark groups exhibit a large 
variation in the number of firm-year observations across countries, with the U.S. accounting 
for the largest (52 percent of the full sample) among the treatment group and Japan accounting 
for the largest (36 percent of full sample) among the benchmark group. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the sample distribution and average CSR performance 
(CSR_Perf) by year. There is an increasing trend in the number of firms included in the sample, 
from 784 firms (3.9 percent) in 2002 to 3,176 firms (15.7 percent) in 2011. The relatively 
smaller number of firms included in our sample in years before 2004 is mainly due to the 
                                               
9 In our robustness test, we further remove all utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and find our inferences 
unchanged. Previous studies (e.g., Fauver et al. 2017) also exclude firms with negative sales, negative book value 
of equity, and total assets less than USD$10 million to improve the comparability of firms across countries. We 
do not impose such requirements in our study given our relatively smaller sample size due to the requirement of 
CSR performance variables from ASSET4. However, we do not find our inferences to be affected even if we do 
impose these additional sample restrictions. 
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change in the ASSET4 company universe. According to ASSET4, its historical ESG data 
during the earlier period of the database covers approximately 1,000 firms (i.e., Russell 1000 
Index firms), mostly U.S. and European companies. 
The increased sample size also justifies the need for a constant sample analysis when 
conducting empirical tests using panel data. As a result, in Table 1, Panel A, we also present 
comparative statistics of firms’ CSR performance across countries for a constant sample in 
which we require a firm to appear at least once in both the pre- and post-reform periods. Our 
results indicate that for treatment countries, on average, firms’ CSR performance improves 
from 0.487 to 0.600 (difference = 0.113, t-value = 13.381). In comparison, for benchmark 
countries, firms’ CSR performance is on average 0.721 in the post-reform period relative to an 
average of 0.654 in the pre-reform period (difference = 0.068, t-value = 5.837). Thus, the results 
from the univariate analysis across treatment and benchmark countries provide preliminary 
support for a positive effect of corporate governance reforms on firms’ CSR performance. 
In Panel B of Table 1, we also observe a gradual improvement in CSR scores during the 
sample period, consistent with the increasing effort that firms devote to their CSR performance 
over time. Panel C of Table 1 reports the sample distribution and average CSR performance by 
industry based on the 22 industry classifications of Barth et al. (1998). Firms in the chemicals 
industry (#4) and manufacturing industries (#7 Rubber/Glass and #11 Transport Equipment) 
appear to have the highest CSR performance, followed by firms in the utilities industry (#16), 
which is consistent with the importance of CSR activities in these industries. In contrast, firms 
in the insurance (#20) and services (#21) industries tend to have a lower level of CSR 
performance. 
[Table 1 Here] 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of key variables used in the main 
analyses. To reduce the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the top 
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and bottom one percentile. The average CSR performance score is around 0.5, comparable with 
those of prior studies that also measure firms’ CSR performance using data from ASSET4 (e.g., 
Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; Lys et al. 2015; El Ghoul et al. 2017; Tsang et al. 2019b). 
 [Table 2 Here] 
Next, we conduct bivariate analysis by obtaining the Pearson correlation coefficients of 
the major variables used in our test. Untabulated results indicate that our variable of interest, 
the post-reform indicator Post, is positively and significantly correlated with the three measures 
of CSR performance, CSR_Perf (0.024), ENV_Perf (0.030), and SOC_Perf (0.014). This 
provides preliminary evidence supporting H1a that firms’ CSR performance improves 
following corporate governance reforms. The results also show that CSR performance is 
positively correlated with firm size, firm age, R&D expenditures, leverage, capital intensity, 
institutional ownership, cross-listing, analyst coverage, and big four auditor. These findings are 
generally consistent with the literature. 
 
5. Regression Results 
5.1. Baseline results 
Table 3 reports the regression results of testing the competing hypotheses regarding the 
effect of corporate governance reforms on CSR performance. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient on Post is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 0.021, p < 0.01) when 
overall CSR performance (CSR_Perf) is the dependent variable. Columns (2) and (3) present 
the results when the dependent variable is separately measured by environmental performance 
(ENV_Perf) and social performance (SOC_Perf). Again, the coefficients on Post are both 
positive and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, results in Table 3 support Hypothesis 1a that a 
country’s implementation of corporate governance reforms improves, on average, firms’ CSR 
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performance. The coefficients of the control variables are generally consistent with those 
reported in the literature (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Lys et al. 2015). 
For robustness, we also measure CSR performance for each category of the 
environmental and social dimensions individually (as described in Appendix C) and find 
generally consistent results. Specifically, our tests indicate significantly positive estimated 
coefficients for eight CSR categories (including #1. resource reduction; #2. emissions reduction; 
#4. employment quality; #5. health and safety; #6. training and development; #7. diversity and 
opportunities; #9. Community; and #10. product responsibility  and) and show insignificant 
results for the remaining two CSR categories (#3. product innovation; and #8. human rights). 
Results from the univariate analysis for CSR performance across each of the ten CSR 
categories are generally consistent with the findings from multivariate regression analyses. 
[Table 3 Here] 
5.2. Alternative DID specification 
Our baseline results are based on a staggered DID research design. While a key advantage 
of this design is that it automatically treats all firms from countries without reforms as of a 
particular time as the benchmark group when evaluating the effect of reforms on firms from 
the treatment group, the various benchmark groups implicitly selected by the model in different 
years provide a less clear picture of the composition of the benchmark sample. To examine 
whether our findings are robust across different model specifications, we use an alternative 
DID design by using one of the following two benchmark groups: (1) the U.K., the first country 
to implement corporate governance reforms after 1998, and (2) all countries with reforms 
implemented outside of the testing period including the U.K. (referred to as non-reformed 
countries). In this specification, we create an indicator variable, Reform, which equals one for 
the treatment firms and zero for the benchmark firms. For the benchmark group (either the U.K. 
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or all non-reformed countries), we assign year 2004 as the pseudo reform year for the definition 
of Post.10 
Column (1) of Table 4 uses all firms in non-reformed countries as benchmark firms. We 
find that the coefficient on the interaction Reform × Post is positive (coefficient = 0.028) and 
significant (p < 0.01). We find similar results in column (3), when we use only firms in the 
U.K. as benchmark firms. Next, we use the PSM approach to identify more comparable 
benchmark firms from non-reformed countries. Specifically, we first estimate a logit regression 
to model the probability of being a treatment firm using the control variables included in model 
(1). We then estimate a propensity score for each firm using the predicted probabilities from 
the logit model. After obtaining the score, we match each treatment firm to a control firm 
selected from the benchmark countries by using the nearest neighbor matching technique 
without replacement. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 report the multivariate regression results 
using propensity score matched firms from non-reformed countries and from the U.K. as the 
benchmark, respectively. In both columns, we find results supporting the prediction of a 
positive effect of corporate governance reform on firms’ CSR performance. 
[Table 4 Here] 
5.3. Other robustness checks 
We perform several other tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, in column 
(1) of Table 5, we present the multivariate regression results using the constant sample instead 
of the full sample. This approach ensures that we are comparing the same set of firms across 
two periods (i.e., the pre- and post-reform periods). The results show a positive and significant 
coefficient on Post (0.02, significant at p < 0.01). Column (2) compares the changes in CSR 
performance across two constant test windows (i.e., one year before and one year after reform). 
                                               
10 We choose 2004 as the pseudo reform year for the benchmark group because this is the year in which one can 
observe the largest number of countries implementing major corporate governance reforms during our sample 
period. In robustness tests, we also use different pseudo reform years (2005, 2006, or 2007) and find qualitatively 
similar results.  
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Albeit with a much smaller sample size due to a shorter window, this approach helps mitigate 
the potential concerns of possible confounding events likely observed during a longer window 
that may also drive a change in firms’ CSR performance. The estimated coefficient on Post is 
still significantly positive (0.041, significant at p < 0.01). In column (3), we exclude all firms 
from the U.S. (i.e., the country with the highest number of observations in the treatment group) 
and find results consistent with our main inference (0.016, significant at p < 0.05).11  
To further alleviate the concern of unequal sample sizes across countries, we use a 
weighted least squares (WLS) model with the number of firm-year observations per country as 
the weight in our estimation. The result reported in column (4) does not alter our inferences 
drawn from the previous table (0.087, significant at p < 0.01). Next, given the positive 
correlation between corporate governance and CSR performance documented in prior studies 
(Jamali et al. 2008; Harjoto and Jo 2011; Jo and Harjoto 2012; Ferrell et al. 2016), we include 
firms’ corporate governance performance score (CG_Perf) obtained from ASSET4 as an 
additional control variable in testing model (1). Consistent results are reported in column (5).12 
Finally, in developing our empirical proxy for CSR performance, we calculate the equally 
weighted average of firms’ social and environmental scores from ASSET4. To ensure that our 
measure is not driven by industry-wide variations, we adjust the CSR performance scores by 
the industry-year mean value and use this industry-year mean adjusted measure, denoted 
CSR_Perf_Adj, as the dependent variable in the regression. The results presented in column (6) 
of Table 5 still show a significantly positive coefficient on Post. Furthermore, given that 
CSR_Perf measures observed CSR outcomes rather than CSR inputs/commitments, as an 
                                               
11 In additional robustness test (untabulated), instead of excluding all U.S. firms, we exclude all firms from Japan 
(i.e., the country with the highest number of observations in the benchmark group) and find our inference still 
holds.  
12 In addition, we add a time trend variable (TIME, which takes on the value of year t less 2002) into the regression 
as an additional control to allow for possible time trends in CSR performance. In untabulated results, we still find 
a positive and significant coefficient on the indicator Post. Thus, our inferences do not change after controlling 
for a possible time trend. 
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alternative CSR performance measure, we calculate a firm’s CSR performance based on the 
firm’s ex ante commitment to CSR initiatives. The ex ante commitment to CSR initiatives is 
captured by the average of the performance score of four CSR drivers (CSR Policy, CSR 
Implementation, CSR Monitoring, and CSR Improvement) provided by ASSET4. Results 
(untabulated) are qualitatively identical when we rerun our tests using this alternative measure 
of CSR performance. 
[Table 5 Here] 
5.4. Parallel trend assumption and Placebo test 
The validity of the DID method depends crucially on the parallel trend assumption. That 
is, in assessing the possible change in CSR performance during the post-reform period, we 
assume that the trend in the outcome variables (i.e. CSR performance) for both the treatment 
and control groups during the pre-reform period is similar. To test the validity of this 
assumption, we plot the distribution of changes in CSR performance from year t-2 to t-1 before 
the reforms implemented in year t for both the treatment and control samples with available 
data in periods before the reforms. The plot shows that the distribution does appear to maintain 
a similar pattern for both samples in the pre-reform period. 
To further assess the validity of the parallel trend assumption underlying the DID method, 
we conduct placebo tests using different pseudo reform years for countries without 
implemented reforms during our sample period. While we are not able to create a pseudo 
reform year earlier than 2002, the first year of our sample period, we are able to conduct 
placebo tests by using a random year after the implementation of corporate governance reforms 
and also by using the pre-reform years for treatment countries with reforms implemented after 
2004. We find no evidence of changes in CSR performance subsequent to pseudo reform years. 
For brevity, results from the placebo tests are not tabulated. 
5.5. Tests of the dynamic effect of corporate governance reforms 
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Our findings thus far suggest that the implementation of corporate governance reforms 
increases firms’ CSR performance. In this section, we examine a dynamic treatment effect by 
decomposing the post-reform period into first year (Post_1), second year (Post_2), and third 
and all subsequent years (Post_3 & Above) after reforms. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Across all measures of CSR performance, we find that increases in CSR performance are 
evident from the second year after a country’s implementation of reforms13 and the positive 
effect of reforms on CSR performance appears to not be temporary but persists for a long 
horizon.  
 [Table 6 Here] 
5.6. Year-by-year examination 
 In this section, we use a year-by-year DID specification on a constant sample to test the 
robustness of our findings. In our sample, major corporate governance reforms by countries 
are mostly distributed over 2003-2006.14 As the U.K. implemented the earliest reform, we use 
it as the benchmark country in this test. We then assign a pseudo reform year to all firms in the 
benchmark country based on the actual reform year of the treatment countries. This 
specification allows us to test the changes in firms’ CSR performance for the treatment firms, 
relative to the changes in CSR performance for the control firms, during the same pre- and 
post-reform year.15 We repeat this test for each year, 2003-2006. We summarize our findings 
in Table 7. Panel A presents the results based on the full sample, and Panel B presents the 
results based on the PSM sample. The results clearly indicate that among the years with major 
                                               
13 We acknowledge the possibility that the finding of a significant increase in CSR performance starting from  
year t+2 after the implementation of reforms can be partially driven by the possible delay of CSR rating agencies 
(such as ASSET4) in measuring firms’ CSR performance.  
14
 During 1998-2007, 6, 10, 3, 5, 3, and 3 countries implemented major corporate governance reforms in 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. The remaining four countries implemented their reforms in 1998 
(the U.K.), 1999 (South Korea), 2000 (Israel), and 2007 (Indonesia). 
15 Our regression model is: CSR_Perf = β0 + β1Post + β2Reform + β3Reform×Post + βk∑Controlsijt +YearFE + 
IndustryFE + CountryFE + εijt,, in which Reform is an indicator variable indicating treatment firms (i.e., firms in 
countries with major corporate governance reforms implemented in year t), and Post is an indicator variable 
indicating whether it is in the post-reform period.  
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corporate governance reforms, we observe increased CSR performance after the 
implementation of reforms (albeit statistically insignificant in 2004). We obtain a similar result 
when we replace the CSR performance measure with either environmental or social 
performance. 
[Table 7 Here] 
 
6. Cross-Sectional Tests and Additional Analyses 
6.1. Different objectives/types of corporate governance reforms 
Next, we examine whether corporate governance reforms with different objectives (i.e., 
promoting board independence, encouraging audit committee and auditor independence, and 
separating the chairman and CEO positions) affect CSR performance differently. The literature 
suggests that all of these corporate governance mechanisms are associated with higher levels 
of board monitoring. 16  Because countries differ in their objectives/types of corporate 
governance reforms, we repeat our analysis after restricting the sample to countries 
implementing each particular type of reform (See Appendix A for a list of countries with each 
type of corporate governance reform). The results are reported in Table 8. Overall, consistent 
with our previous findings, we continue to observe a positive relation between reforms and 
CSR performance across all types of board reforms. 
[Table 8 Here] 
6.2. Different approaches to corporate governance reform 
We now examine whether the effect of corporate governance reforms on CSR 
performance varies across comply-or-explain or rule-based reforms. While both reform 
approaches are prevalent, there are conflicting views regarding which is better. Some argue 
                                               
16 For example, Weisbach (1988) finds that board independence increases monitoring effectiveness. Xie et al. 
(2003) find that a greater level of audit committee and auditor independence reduces earnings management. 
Similarly, Sarkar et al. (2008) show that CEO duality is associated with higher management window-dressing 
propensity, suggesting that separating the chairman and CEO positions can enhance corporate monitoring. 
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that the one-size-fits-all rule-based approach runs the risk of becoming overregulation, while 
others opine that the comply-or-explain approach might not yield the intended effect. To test 
the moderation effect of the reform approaches, we use an indicator variable, Rule, to identify 
countries with rule-based reform and interact this variable with Post.17 Thus, the interaction 
term Post × Rule captures the difference (if any) in the effect of rule-based reforms relative to 
comply-or-explain-based reforms on CSR performance.  
The results are presented in Table 9. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive 
and significant across three measures of CSR performance. These results suggest that the effect 
of corporate governance reforms on CSR performance is stronger when the reform takes the 
rule-based approach. Additional (untabulated) analysis also indicates that firms in rule-based 
reform countries tend to have weaker CSR performance prior to corporate governance reform, 
suggesting that reforms may have a greater effect in countries with a greater potential for CSR 
improvement. 
[Table 9 Here] 
6.3. The moderating effect of CSR awareness 
The literature suggests that the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms could 
be conditional on country-level institutions. For instance, Dahya et al. (2008) find that board 
independence, a major element of corporate governance, is positively related to firm value in 
countries with poor investor protection but do not find a significant relation in countries with 
strong investor protection. Turning to CSR performance, prior studies suggest that the value of 
CSR initiatives is greater in stakeholder-oriented countries that place greater emphasis on CSR 
activities (Simnett et al. 2009; van der Laan Smith et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Therefore, 
we expect to observe a stronger positive effect of corporate governance reforms on CSR 
                                               
17 In our test, Rule is not included as a main effect because it has no within-firm variation after we include firm 
fixed effects in the model. 
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performance when investors have a higher level of CSR awareness. However, in countries 
where the level of CSR awareness is high, it is also likely that further improvement of CSR 
performance is more costly given the high level of CSR performance in the pre-reform period.18 
This prediction suggests a weaker effect of reforms on CSR performance in countries with high 
levels of CSR awareness. 
 To examine whether and how country-level CSR awareness affects the relationship 
between corporate governance reforms and CSR performance, we interact Post with an 
indicator variable, HI_Pubaware, which captures the level of public awareness of CSR issues 
in individual countries (Dhaliwal et al. 2012).19 Results reported in Table 10 show a negative 
and significant coefficient on the interaction term Post × HI_Pubaware. These findings support 
the conjecture that, relative to countries with lower levels of CSR awareness before reforms, 
countries with higher levels of CSR awareness tend to observe a weaker CSR performance 
after the implementation of corporate governance reforms. 
 [Table 10 Here] 
6.4. The moderating effect of legal and regulatory environment 
An effective corporate governance framework requires an effective legal and regulatory 
foundation (OECD 2006). Research suggests that the effect of regulatory changes (such as the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards) depends crucially on the level and/or 
effectiveness of its enforcement (e.g., Christensen et al. 2013; Ponticelli and Alencar 2016). 
Consistent with this view, Brown et al. (2014) show that the effectiveness of accounting 
regulation is more pronounced in countries with stronger enforcement. 
                                               
18
 Additional (untabulated) analysis indicates that firms domiciled in countries with higher level of CSR awareness 
indeed tend to have higher levels of CSR performance prior to corporate governance reform, suggesting that 
reforms may have a weaker effect in countries with greater levels of CSR awareness. 
19 HI_Pubaware is an indicator variable which equals to one (zero) if the mean rank score of (1) the number of 
non-government organizations per million population and (2) total number of CSR reports issued by non-
commercial organizations divided by millions in population for each country is above (below) the sample median 
in the same year. The results are qualitatively similar when we use alternative stakeholder orientation measures 
from Dhaliwal et al. (2012). 
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In this section, we examine whether the positive association between reforms and CSR 
performance varies with the stringency of the legal and regulatory environment in a country. 
To examine the role of country-level legal environment in moderating the effect of corporate 
governance reforms on CSR performance, we use two variables to capture the stringency or 
development of a country’s legal and regulatory environment and interact each of these 
variables with Post. The country-level stringency of legal environment is proxied by country-
level (1) investor protection index, measuring the strength of investor protection, obtained from 
“Doing Business Indicators” by the International Finance Corporation and World Bank and (2) 
regulatory quality index, which captures perceptions of the ability of a government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development, obtained from “Worldwide Governance Indicators” by the World Bank. To 
facilitate interpretation, in the empirical model we use an indicator variable, HI_InvPro, which 
equals one (zero) if the investor protection index is above (below) the sample median. Similarly, 
HI_RegQual is an indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the regulatory quality index is 
above (below) the sample median. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 11. Column (1) shows a positive and 
significant coefficient on Post × HI_InvPro, suggesting that the effect of corporate governance 
reforms is stronger in countries with higher levels of investor protection. Consistently, we find 
a significantly positive coefficient on Post × HI_RegQual in column (2), which again supports 
the prediction that the positive effect of corporate governance reforms on CSR performance is 
more pronounced in countries with a more stringent regulatory environment.20 
[Table 11 Here] 
6.5. The moderating effect of ownership 
                                               
20 As an additional analysis, we include both Post × HI_Pubaware and Post × HI_InvPro (or alternatively Post 
× HI_Pubaware and Post × HI_RegQual) in the same model and find our inferences from both Table 10 and 11 
unchanged. 
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 Using an international setting, Dyck et al. (2019) present evidence that institutional 
ownership is positively associated with firms’ CSR performance. They further show that the 
positive effect of institutional ownership on firms’ CSR performance is motivated by both 
financial and social returns as perceived by institutional investors. Other studies suggest that 
firms with more concentrated insider ownership are likely to observe a greater level of conflict 
of interest between controlling insiders and external shareholders (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2003; Stulz 2005; Koirala et al. 2018). Following these findings, we examine whether and how 
institutional ownership and insider ownership moderate the effect of corporate governance 
reforms on firms’ CSR performance. Data for institutional and insider ownership are obtained 
from the Capital IQ database. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 12. In column (1), we interact Post 
with HI_Institution (i.e., an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s institutional ownership 
is greater than the median institutional ownership of all firms in the same industry and zero 
otherwise) and find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term Post × 
HI_Institution (0.01, significant at p < 0.01). This finding is consistent with institutional 
investors placing greater pressure on firms to engage in more CSR activities. In column (2) we 
interact Post with HI_Insider, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s CEO ownership 
is greater than the median CEO ownership of all firms in the same industry and zero otherwise. 
The results show a significantly negative coefficient on Post × HI_Insider (-0.02, significant 
at p < 0.01), indicating a weakened effect of reforms on CSR performance when firms’ insider 
ownership is high. Consistent with previous studies, our findings suggest that the presence of 
agency conflict reduces managers’ incentives for CSR investment. 
[Table 12 Here] 
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6.6. Corporate governance reform, CSR performance, and future financial performance 
While our evidence suggests a positive effect of corporate governance reforms on CSR 
performance, there are two possible explanations underlying this finding. First, shareholders 
believe in the value-maximizing role of CSR so that corporate governance reforms may 
encourage firms to engage in more CSR activities that ultimately enhance shareholder value. 
Second, better CSR performance may simply result from the greater influence of outside board 
members who care about the societal effect of companies even if CSR investment does not 
increase shareholder wealth. To differentiate these two explanations, in this section, we 
examine whether and how reforms affect the relationship between CSR performance and firms’ 
future financial performance. 
Our proxy for firm value is Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q) because this variable captures the 
value of CSR achieved through various channels, such as increased future cash flows due to 
customer and supplier royalty, and lower cost of equity capital, which reflects the lower risk 
perceived by investors. Following previous studies (e.g., Waddock and Graves 1997; Servaes 
and Tamayo 2013; El Ghoul et al. 2017), we measure Tobin’s Q as the ratio of a firm’s market 
value to its book value of assets, in which the market value is calculated as the book value of 
total assets minus the book value of total equity plus the market value of equity. 
Table 13 reports the results of this analysis. First, we find a positive and significant 
coefficient on CSR_Perf, indicating that CSR performance is positively related to future 
financial performance. This finding is in line with the findings of previous studies (e.g., El 
Ghoul et al. 2017; Tsang et al. 2019b). We also find a positive and significant coefficient on 
the three-way interaction term CSR_Perf × Reform × Post. This finding suggests that relative 
to firms domiciled in countries without reforms implemented during the same period, firms 
domiciled in countries with reforms are more likely to experience a strengthened relation 
between CSR performance and future financial performance subsequent to the reforms. Thus, 
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this finding lends support to the argument that corporate governance reforms foster substantive 
CSR performance with a strong implication to firm value. 
 [Table 13 Here] 
6.7. CSR performance versus CSR reporting 
Due to the increasing importance of CSR activities to firms’ financial performance, many 
firms voluntarily publish CSR reports to signal their commitment to socially responsible 
behavior (Lanis and Richardson 2012) and reduce information asymmetry between firms and 
investors (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; 2012). There is also growing evidence that investors consider 
CSR information in their decisions (Clarkson et al. 2013; Griffin and Sun 2013; Elliott et al. 
2014), suggesting that the transparency of CSR information matters to shareholder value. Other 
studies, however, argue that managers can use CSR reporting for purely symbolic purposes or 
“green-washing” (Weaver et al. 1999; Hemingway and Maclagan 2004; Kim et al. 2012; 
Ramanna 2013). That is, firms can disclose CSR information that deviates from actual CSR 
performance. Supporting this view, Petrenko et al. (2016) find evidence that firms implement 
CSR activities for image management without a real focus on improving financial performance. 
While our evidence supports the positive influence of corporate governance reforms on 
firms’ CSR performance, the studies discussed above suggest that instead of committing to 
more costly and substantive CSR investment, managers may simply improve their CSR 
reporting practices (Simnett et al. 2009; Ramanna 2013). Improved transparency of CSR 
performance after reform implementation presumably allows better monitoring by 
shareholders and discourages insiders from extracting private benefits from CSR investment, 
thereby promoting more substantive CSR performance. Alternatively, managers may 
voluntarily disclose more CSR information that deviates from their actual CSR performance 
for impression management (Clarkson et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2016; Muslu et al. 2019). That 
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is, a possible alternative channel through which reforms affect firms’ CSR performance is 
changes in CSR reporting practices after reforms. 
Thus, in this section, we examine whether and to what extent the implementation of 
corporate governance reforms in a country affects firms’ CSR reporting practices. Following 
prior studies (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2016; Muslu et al. 2017; Tsang et al. 2019b), 
we use multiple CSR reporting variables to measure firms’ CSR reporting practices. These 
variables are indicator variables measuring (1) whether a company issues a standalone CSR 
report in a particular year, CSRDISC, (2) whether a firm’s CSR report is prepared in accordance 
with the GRI guidelines, CSRDISC_GRI, (3) whether a firm’s CSR report is assured by an 
independent third party for its accuracy, completeness, and reliability, 
CSRDISC_ASSURANCE, and (4) whether a firm is integrating its CSR information in its 
annual report, CSRDISC_INTEGRATE. All of these data are obtainable from the ASSET4 
database. We treat all of these variables as dependent variables and test the effect of reforms 
on each of them using a logistic model. However, in all of these tests, we find no evidence that 
managers alter their CSR reporting practices post-reforms. 
 
7. Conclusion 
CSR is generally considered to be corporate behavior that goes beyond the legal or 
regulatory requirements faced by the company (Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012). Over the 
last two decades, CSR activities have become an increasingly important investment by firms. 
Despite anecdotal evidence that a growing number of multinational companies are actively 
involved in CSR initiatives (Porter and Kramer 2011), there are competing views regarding 
whether CSR investments enhance shareholder value or simply represent an agency cost 
enjoyed by managers at the expense of shareholders. These competing views are manifested in 
the mixed empirical evidence concerning the relationship between CSR practices and firm 
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financial performance (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Barnett and 
Salomon 2006; McWilliams et al. 2006). 
As corporate governance reforms are undertaken to reduce agency conflicts between 
corporate insiders and shareholders, the agency cost perspective (Barnea and Rubin 2010; 
Krüger 2015; Masulis and Reza 2015) of CSR would suggest a decrease in CSR performance 
after corporate governance reforms. However, if CSR activities maximize shareholder value as 
suggested by the “doing well by doing good” perspective (Freeman 1984; Herremans et al. 
1993; El Ghoul et al. 2011; Flammer 2015), CSR performance should improve after corporate 
governance reforms. Motivated by these contrasting expectations, we empirically examine the 
effect of corporate governance reforms on firms’ CSR performance. Using a shock-based DID 
research design that includes both firm and year fixed effects, we find that firms’ CSR 
performance improves following a country’s implementation of corporate governance reforms. 
Additional analyses show that relative to firms in countries with comply-or-explain 
reforms, the effect of corporate governance reforms on CSR performance is greater in countries 
with rule-based reforms. We also find that the positive effect of reforms on CSR performance 
is more pronounced when a society possesses a lower level of CSR awareness and when a 
country has a more stringent legal and regulatory environment. Further analysis shows that 
corporate governance reforms strengthen the positive relation between CSR performance and 
future financial performance, consistent with the value-enhancing role of CSR. 
Overall, in this study, we document that the widespread adoption of corporate governance 
reforms appears to have a causal and positive effect on CSR performance worldwide. While 
the literature is inconclusive about the effect of corporate governance on CSR performance, we 
complement those studies by using a quasi-natural experiment that mitigates endogeneity 
concerns and thereby provides additional and more direct evidence of the effect of governance 
across different institutional environments. 
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Note: Figure 1 shows the names of the 15 treatment countries in our analyses. R indicates that the reform 
implemented in the country is rule-based reform.  
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Appendix A - Major Corporate Governance Reforms Worldwide 
  
Country Major Reform Year 
Board 
Independence 
Audit Committee 
and Auditor 
Independence 
Chairman and 
CEO Role 
Reform 
Approach 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 Australia* 2004 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
2 Austria* 2004 1 1 0 Comply-or-explain 
3 Belgium* 2005 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
4 Brazil 2002 0 0 0 Rule-based 
5 Canada* 2004 1 1 1 Rule-based 
6 Chile 2001 0 1 0 Rule-based 
7 China 2001 1 1 0 Rule-based 
8 Denmark 2001 1 0 0 Comply-or-explain 
9 Finland* 2004 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
10 France* 2003 0 1 0 Rule-based 
11 Germany 2002 1 1 0 Comply-or-explain 
12 Greece 2002 1 1 0 Rule-based 
13 Hong Kong* 2005 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
14 India 2002 1 1 0 Rule-based 
15 Indonesia* 2007 1 1 0 Rule-based 
16 Israel 2000 1 1 1 Rule-based 
17 Italy* 2006 1 1 0 Rule-based 
18 Japan 2002 0 1 0 Rule-based 
19 Malaysia 2001 1 1 0 Comply-or-explain 
20 Mexico 2001 1 1 0 Rule-based 
21 Netherlands* 2004 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
22 Norway* 2005 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
23 Philippines 2002 1 1 0 Comply-or-explain 
24 Poland 2002 1 0 0 Comply-or-explain 
25 Portugal 2001 1 1 0 Rule-based 
26 Singapore* 2003 1 1 0 Comply-or-explain 
27 South Korea 1999 1 1 0 Rule-based 
28 Spain* 2006 1 1 0 Comply-or-explain 
29 Sweden* 2006 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
30 Switzerland 2002 0 0 0 Comply-or-explain 
31 Thailand 2002 1 1 0 Comply-or-explain 
32 Turkey 2002 1 0 1 Comply-or-explain 
33 United Kingdom 1998 1 1 1 Comply-or-explain 
34 United States* 2003 1 1 0 Rule-based 
 
Note: Appendix A reports the characteristics of major corporate governance reforms by country. Column 2 presents the year 
in which the reform became effective. Columns 3 to 5 present whether a reform covers board independence, audit committee 
and auditor independence, and separation of the chairman and CEO positions, respectively. Column 6 reports the type of 
reform approach. * indicates countries in the treatment group examined in our study. Data source: Fauver et al. (2017).
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Appendix B - Summary of Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
CSR_Perf The average of the environment performance score and the social performance 
score. 
ASSET4 
ENV_Perf Environment performance score ASSET4 
SOC_Perf Social performance score ASSET4 
Tobin's Q  The book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity divided by book value of total assets.  
Capital IQ 
Post An indicator variable that equals 1 for the year in which the corporate governance 
reform in a country became effective and afterward, and 0 otherwise. 
Fauver et al. 
(2017) 
Reform An indicator variable that equals 1 if corporate governance reform is implemented 
during our sample period and 0 if it is not. 
Fauver et al. 
(2017) 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets (in millions of US dollars). Capital IQ 
Age The natural logarithm of firm age, which is defined as the number of years since the 
firm was incorporated (plus 1). 
Capital IQ 
RD The ratio of total research and development expense to net sales for a given year. Capital IQ 
Leverage The ratio of total debt divided by total assets. Capital IQ 
Accrual A measure of firm-level financial opacity measured by country-industry-year-
adjusted total scaled accruals based on Bhattacharya et al. (2003). ACCRUAL = 
(ΔCA - ΔCL - ΔCASH + ΔSTD - DEP + ΔTP)/lag(TA), where ΔCA is the change in 
total current assets; ΔCL is the change in total current liabilities; ΔCASH is the 
change in cash; ΔSTD is the change in the current portion of long-term debt included 
in total current liabilities; DEP is depreciation and amortization expense; ΔTP is the 
change in income taxes payable; and lag(TA) is total assets at the end of the previous 
year. 
Capital IQ 
Competition It equals to Herfindahl index multiply (-1), where the Herfindahl index is calculated 
as the sum of the squares of fractional market shares of firms within each two-digit 
SIC industry for each country in a given year. 
Capital IQ 
SalesGrowth The total revenues at year t minus total revenues at year t-1 divided by total revenues 
at year t-1. 
Capital IQ 
Capital The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Capital IQ 
MB The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Capital IQ 
Institution The proportion of shares held by all types of institutional investors, measured at the 
end of year t. 
Capital IQ 
Nmarket The number of stock exchanges on which a firm is listed in a given year (plus 1, to 
account for the listing of a firm’s stock in its home country). 
Capital IQ 
Analyst The number of analysts following a firm in a given year. I/B/E/S 
Big4Auditor An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s auditor is a big four auditor and 0 
otherwise. 
Capital IQ 
CG_Perf Corporate governance score ASSET4 
Rule An indicator equal to 1 if a country’s corporate governance reform is rule-based and 
0 if a country’s corporate governance reform is comply-or-explain based. 
Fauver et al. 
(2017) 
HI_Pubaware An indicator variable which equals to one (zero) if the CSR public awareness index 
is above (below) the sample median. The CSR public awareness index is obtained 
from Dhaliwal et al. (2012). It is measured at the country level and calculated as the 
mean rank score of (1) the number of non-government organizations per million 
population and (2) total number of CSR reports issued by non-commercial 
organizations divided by millions in population in each country.   
Dhaliwal et al. 
(2012) 
HI_InvPro An indicator variable which equals one (zero) if the investor protection index is 
above (below) the sample median. The investor protection index measures the 
strength of investor protection in a country and is obtained from “Doing Business 
Indicators” by the International Finance Corporation and World Bank. 
International 
Finance 
Corporation, 
World Bank 
HI_RegQual An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the regulatory quality index is above 
(below) the sample median. The regulatory quality index measures the level of 
credit market regulations, labor market regulations, and business regulations in a 
country, and is obtained from “Economic Freedom of the World” by Fraser 
Institute. 
Fraser Institute 
Insider The percentage of shares (end-of-year) held by the CEO. Capital IQ 
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Appendix C - CSR Categories (Data source: ASSET4) 
  Category Definition 
I. Environment Pillar 
1 Resource Reduction A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward achieving an efficient use of natural 
resources in the production process.  
2 Emissions Reduction A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward reducing environmental emissions in 
the production and operational processes.  
3 Product Innovation A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward supporting the research and 
development of eco-efficient products or services. 
 
II. Social Pillar 
4 Workforce / Employment Quality A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward providing high-quality employment 
benefits and job conditions.  
5 Workforce / Health and Safety A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward providing a healthy and safe 
workplace. 
6 Workforce / Training and Development A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward providing training and development 
(education) for its workforce. 
7 Workforce / Diversity and Opportunity A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward maintaining diversity and equal 
opportunities in its workforce. 
8 Society / Human Rights A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward respecting fundamental human rights 
conventions.  
9 Society / Community A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward maintaining the company’s reputation 
within the general community (local, national, and global). 
10 Customer / Product Responsibility A company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward creating value-added products and 
services upholding customers’ security.  
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Table 1 Sample Distribution    
Panel A: Sample distribution by country    
  Country             Full Sample   Constant Sample    
    Obs. CSR_Perf   Obs. CSR_Perf Pre-reform Post-reform Diff (Post-Pre) 
                                                                                             Treatment Group (Reform =1) 
 
   
1 Australia 1,047 0.385  30 0.847 0.841 0.849 0.009 
2 Austria 150 0.539  87 0.566 0.629 0.538 -0.092* 
3 Belgium 209 0.506  162 0.501 0.468 0.522 0.054 
4 Canada 1,349 0.372  118 0.776 0.751 0.789 0.038 
5 France 677 0.743  388 0.810 0.729 0.831 0.102*** 
6 Finland 203 0.710  140 0.723 0.71 0.728 0.018 
7 Hong Kong 519 0.342  279 0.424 0.348 0.454 0.106*** 
8 Indonesia 51 0.551  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9 Italy 304 0.602  269 0.597 0.549 0.636 0.087** 
10 Netherlands 277 0.682  175 0.746 0.646 0.798 0.153*** 
11 Norway 155 0.650  142 0.640 0.603 0.663 0.060 
12 Singapore 287 0.347  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
13 Spain 333 0.705  284 0.720 0.638 0.792 0.154*** 
14 Sweden 388 0.633  364 0.648 0.596 0.691 0.096*** 
15 United States 6,394 0.434  3,412 0.505 0.358 0.546 0.188*** 
 Subtotal 12,343 0.467   5,850 0.569 
 
0.487 0.600 0.113*** 
    
                                                                                           Benchmark Group (Reform =0) 
 
   
16 Brazil 177 0.580  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
17 Chile 49 0.446  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
18 China 308 0.277  10 0.686 0.476 0.776 0.300*** 
19 Denmark 176 0.547  137 0.552 0.480 0.583 0.103** 
20 Greece 139 0.461  91 0.439 0.596 0.691 0.096*** 
21 Germany 566 0.656  301 0.727 0.671 0.752 0.082** 
22 India 157 0.603  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
23 Israel 32 0.261  10 0.280 0.151 0.336 0.185 
24 Japan 2,828 0.537  240 0.759 0.673 0.796 0.124*** 
25 Malaysia 96 0.419  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
26 Mexico 96 0.472  10 0.905 0.903 0.905 0.002 
27 Philippines 37 0.392  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
28 Poland 42 0.368  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
29 Portugal 69 0.736  28 0.792 0.673 0.831 0.158*** 
30 South Korea 239 0.605  10 0.884 0.794 0.923 0.129*** 
31 Switzerland 540 0.573  351 0.663 0.611 0.686 0.075** 
32 Turkey 53 0.505  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
33 Thailand 43 0.558  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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34 United Kingdom 2,303 0.607  860 0.738 0.715 0.749 0.034** 
 Subtotal 7,950 0.558   2,048 0.700 0.654 0.721 0.068*** 
  Overall Total 20,293 0.503   7,898 0.603 0.535 0.630 0.095*** 
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Panel B: Sample distribution by year 
Year              Full Sample               Constant Sample  
  Obs. CSR_Perf   Obs. CSR_Perf 
2002 784 0.494  775 0.495 
2003 791 0.498  782 0.498 
2004 1,517 0.487  844 0.569 
2005 1,862 0.490  855 0.566 
2006 1,878 0.493  843 0.564 
2007 2,029 0.505  794 0.611 
2008 2,392 0.509  774 0.650 
2009 2,735 0.507  762 0.685 
2010 3,129 0.509  745 0.700 
2011 3,176 0.511  724 0.714 
Total 20,293 0.503   7,898 0.603 
 
 
Panel C: Sample distribution by industry 
Industry Full Sample   Constant Sample  
 Obs. CSR_Perf   Obs. CSR_Perf 
(1) Mining/Construction  1,432 0.463  307 0.667 
(2) Food 912 0.557  362 0.613 
(3) Textiles/Print/Publish 925 0.539  433 0.574 
(4) Chemicals 923 0.700  432 0.728 
(5) Pharmaceuticals 656 0.521  335 0.633 
(6) Extractive 1,249 0.455  388 0.647 
(7) Manf: Rubber/Glass/Etc. 493 0.661  193 0.720 
(8) Manf: Metal 697 0.561  227 0.626 
(9) Manf: Machinery 756 0.567  324 0.621 
(10) Manf: Electrical Equipment 527 0.609  252 0.647 
(11) Manf: Transport Equipment 727 0.663  315 0.772 
(12) Manf: Instruments 671 0.518  344 0.571 
(13) Manf: Misc. 105 0.498  39 0.530 
(14) Computers 1,714 0.468  696 0.513 
(15) Transportation 1,870 0.498  790 0.605 
(16) Utilities 1,233 0.599  550 0.688 
(17) Retail: Wholesale 518 0.448  177 0.545 
(18) Retail: Misc. 1,260 0.441  527 0.565 
(19) Retail: Restaurant 181 0.558  96 0.661 
(20) Insurance/Real Estate 1,751 0.358  521 0.496 
(21) Services 1,311 0.386  460 0.463 
(22) Others 382 0.351  130 0.465 
       Total 20,293 0.503   7,898 0.603 
 
Note: Panels A, B, and C of this table present the sample distributions by country, year, and industry, respectively. The 
industry definition of Panel C is based on the industry classification of Barth et al. (1998). We exclude firms in the financial 
industry (SIC codes 6000-6411) from our sample. In the constant sample, we require a firm to appear for at least one year in 
the pre- and post-reform periods. 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics (N=20,293) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% 
CSR_Perf 0.503 0.295 0.215 0.477 0.800 
ENV_Perf 0.507 0.318 0.180 0.472 0.846 
SOC_Perf 0.499 0.309 0.199 0.485 0.806 
Tobin's Q  1.686 1.025 1.069 1.353 1.913 
Post 0.907 0.290 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Reform 0.608 0.488 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Size 8.592 1.382 7.688 8.513 9.489 
Age 3.790 0.947 3.135 3.932 4.554 
RD 0.017 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.560 0.204 0.425 0.570 0.698 
Accrual 0.000 0.097 -0.034 0.000 0.035 
Competition -0.253 0.248 -0.352 -0.146 -0.082 
SalesGrowth 0.140 0.322 -0.013 0.096 0.225 
Capital  -0.052 0.052 -0.068 -0.038 -0.017 
MB 2.616 2.798 1.162 1.879 3.147 
Institution 0.379 0.342 0.005 0.297 0.690 
Nmarket 1.308 0.653 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Analyst 12.84 11.23 0.000 12.000 20.000 
Big4Auditor 0.776 0.417 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: This table presents the summary statistics for the main variables used in regression analyses. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 3 Corporate Governance Reform and CSR Performance—Staggered DID 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf  ENV_Perf  SOC_Perf  
Post 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.030*** 0.039*** 0.022* 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
RD 0.105 0.059 0.149 
 (0.088) (0.103) (0.101) 
Leverage -0.035*** -0.009 -0.061*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Accrual -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Competition -0.016 -0.026 -0.006 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) 
SalesGrowth -0.009*** -0.010** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital  -0.008 0.043 -0.059 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.043) 
MB 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution -0.013* -0.012 -0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Nmarket -0.010** -0.003 -0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Analyst 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor -0.002 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.081* 0.052 0.109** 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) 
    
    
Obs. 20,293 20,293 20,293 
R-squared 0.223 0.172 0.180 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the regression results for the effect of corporate governance reform on CSR performance. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is CSR_Perf, measured as the average of environmental performance and 
social performance scores in ASSET4. The dependent variable in column (2) is EVN_Perf, which is the 
environmental performance score in ASSET4. The dependent variable in column (3) is SOC_Perf, which is the 
social performance score in ASSET4. Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the year that corporate 
governance reform became effective in a country and afterward, and 0 otherwise. All of the variables are defined 
in Appendix B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Corporate Governance Reform and CSR Performance—Alternative DID Design 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Benchmark Country Non-reformed Countries as Benchmark  U.K. as Benchmark 
 Full Sample PSM Sample  Full Sample PSM Sample 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf  CSR_Perf    CSR_Perf  CSR_Perf  
Post -0.025*** -0.019**  -0.056*** -0.044*** 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.013) 
Reform -0.216*** -0.203***  -0.228*** -0.238*** 
 (0.017) (0.018)  (0.016) (0.024) 
Reform × Post 0.028*** 0.017**  0.049*** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.013) 
Size 0.075*** 0.076***  0.077*** 0.078*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Age 0.044*** 0.040***  0.044*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.006) 
RD 0.297*** 0.449***  0.346*** 0.305 
 (0.065) (0.087)  (0.072) (0.192) 
Leverage 0.001 -0.021*  0.022* 0.030 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.019) 
Accrual -0.003 -0.006  -0.000 -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.021) 
Competition 0.012 0.020  -0.012 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.024) 
SalesGrowth -0.018*** -0.021***  -0.018*** -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.008) 
Capital  -0.057* -0.036  -0.017 0.176** 
 (0.034) (0.041)  (0.039) (0.081) 
MB 0.002*** 0.003***  0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution -0.008 -0.012  -0.001 0.020* 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.012) 
Nmarket 0.010*** 0.008**  0.007* 0.013 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.010) 
Analyst 0.002*** 0.002***  0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor 0.001 0.002  0.004 -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.011) 
Constant -0.255*** -0.228***  -0.270*** -0.188*** 
 (0.024) (0.027)  (0.026) (0.040) 
      
Obs. 20,293 15,900  14,646 4,606 
Firm FE NO NO  NO NO 
Country FE YES YES  YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES   YES YES 
Note: This table presents the regression results for the effect of corporate governance reform on CSR performance using 
the alternative DID design. Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 starting the year in which corporate governance 
reform became effective in a country and 0 otherwise. Reform is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in a 
country that implemented corporate governance reform during our sample period and 0 otherwise. The pseudo (i.e., 
assigned) reform year for benchmark countries is 2004. Columns (1) and (2) report the results by using 19 non-reformed 
countries as the benchmark. Columns (3) and (4) report the results by using U.K. as the benchmark. In columns (2) and 
(4), we match firms in the treatment group with firms in the benchmark group using PSM. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Various Robustness Tests  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Constant Sample [-1, 1] window Excluding U.S. 
WLS 
Regression 
Controlling 
CG_Perf 
Alternative CSR 
Performance 
Measure 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf CSR_Perf CSR_Perf CSR_Perf CSR_Perf CSR_Perf_Adj 
Post 0.020*** 0.041*** 0.016** 0.087*** 0.014** 0.003** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) 
Size 0.021*** 0.038* 0.038*** 0.074*** 0.017*** -0.004*** 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) 
Age 0.050** -0.058 0.040* 0.045*** 0.028 0.008* 
 (0.020) (0.092) (0.022) (0.003) (0.019) (0.004) 
RD 0.219 -0.845* 0.288 0.485*** 0.222 0.001 
 (0.142) (0.499) (0.215) (0.054) (0.138) (0.030) 
Leverage -0.062*** -0.182** -0.138*** 0.111*** -0.046** -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.078) (0.027) (0.015) (0.020) (0.004) 
Accrual 0.024 -0.044 0.011 0.110*** 0.019 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.055) (0.027) (0.033) (0.020) (0.004) 
Competition -0.020 -0.183 -0.009 -0.141*** -0.019 -0.005 
 (0.033) (0.190) (0.032) (0.011) (0.032) (0.007) 
SalesGrowth -0.009 -0.004 -0.030*** -0.077*** -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.002) 
Capital  0.091 0.375 0.060 -0.554*** 0.043 0.054*** 
 (0.089) (0.276) (0.103) (0.071) (0.086) (0.019) 
MB 0.002* 0.002 0.003** 0.003*** 0.001* 0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Institution -0.068*** -0.261*** -0.026 -0.032*** -0.064*** 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.089) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012) (0.003) 
Nmarket -0.023*** 0.019 0.014** 0.028*** -0.033*** -0.006*** 
 (0.005) (0.023) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
Analyst 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor 0.009 0.019 0.022** 0.055*** 0.004 0.005*** 
 (0.009) (0.035) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) 
CG_Perf     0.253***  
     (0.012)  
Constant 0.171* 0.515 0.136 -0.546*** 0.178** 0.547*** 
 (0.089) (0.400) (0.105) (0.025) (0.087) (0.019) 
       
Obs. 7,898 1,278 4,486 7,898 7,898 7,898 
R-squared 0.240 0.172 0.177 0.335 0.287 0.042 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the regression results of various robustness tests examining the effect of corporate governance 
reform on CSR performance. Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 starting the year in which corporate governance 
reform became effective in a country and 0 otherwise. Column (1) reports the results based on the constant sample. 
Column (2) reports the results using a window of one year before and one year after reform to measure changes in CSR 
performance. Column (3) excludes U.S. firms from the sample. Column (4) uses WLS regression estimation on the 
constant sample. Column (5) adds a corporate governance score (CG_Perf) provided by ASSET4 as an additional control 
variable. Column (6) uses an adjusted CSR performance variable, CSR_Perf_Adj, as the dependent variable. Specifically, 
we adjust the CSR performance scores by subtracting the industry-year mean value of CSR_Perf from the firm’s 
CSR_Perf. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6 Corporate Governance Reform and CSR Performance—Dynamic DID Design 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf ENV_Perf SOC_Perf 
Post_1 -0.217*** -0.199*** -0.227*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Post_2 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Post_3 and above -0.023** -0.020* -0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Reform -0.006 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Reform*Post_1 -0.001 0.006 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Reform*Post_2 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
Reform*Post_3 and above 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
RD 0.306*** 0.333*** 0.308*** 
 (0.065) (0.072) (0.072) 
Leverage 0.000 0.019 -0.015 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Accrual -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Competition 0.009 0.009 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
SalesGrowth -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital  -0.056* -0.038 -0.088** 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) 
MB 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Nmarket 0.008** 0.014*** 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Analyst 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -0.259*** -0.281*** -0.277*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) 
    
Obs. 20,293 20,293 20,293 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the regression results for the effect of board reforms on CSR performance by using dynamic 
DID design. Post_1 indicates the first year after reform; Post_2 indicates the second year after reform; Post_3 & 
Above indicates the third and all subsequent years after reforms. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 7 Summary of Year-by-Year DID Regression Results 
Panel A: Using constant full sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform Year Estimated 
Coefficients of β3 
P-Value No. of Treatment Countries Benchmark Country 
2003 0.105*** 0.000 1 United Kingdom 
2004 -0.010 0.589 5 United Kingdom 
2005 0.054*** 0.003 3 United Kingdom 
2006 0.048*** 0.004 3 United Kingdom 
     
Panel B: Using constant PSM sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reform Year Estimated 
Coefficients of β3 
P-Value No. of Treatment Countries Benchmark Country 
2003 0.057*** 0.006 1 United Kingdom 
2004 -0.023 0.333 5 United Kingdom 
2005 0.068*** 0.001 3 United Kingdom 
2006 0.031* 0.078 3 United Kingdom 
 
Note: This table reports the summary of year-by-year DID regression results estimating the effect of corporate 
governance reforms on firms’ CSR performance in countries with reforms implemented in year t, relative to firms in 
the U.K. in year t, during the 2003-2006 period. In this test, we require firms to appear in both the pre- and post-reform 
period. Our regression model is CSR_Perf = β0 + β1Post + β2Reform + β3Reform×Post + βk∑Controlsijt +YearFE + 
IndustryFE + CountryFE + εijt,. CSR_Perf is measured as the average of the environmental performance and social 
performance scores in ASSET4. Reform is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country implements corporate 
governance reform and 0 otherwise (i.e., for U.K. firms, Reform=0). Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the 
year that corporate governance reform became effective in a country and afterward, and 0 otherwise. We assign a 
pseudo reform year for all U.K. firms based on the reform year of the treatment firms. In this table, we do not include 
test for 2007 because there is only one country, Indonesia implemented reforms in 2007. Although there is 51 obs. 
included in Indonesia, there is no constant sample available for conducting this analysis. All of the variables are 
defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Corporate Governance Reform Type and CSR Performance  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reform Type Board Independence Audit Committee and Auditor Independence 
Chairman and 
CEO Role 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf CSR_Perf CSR_Perf 
Post 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Size 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Age 0.024** 0.025** 0.023 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) 
RD 0.129 0.171* -0.207 
 (0.108) (0.090) (0.203) 
Leverage -0.019 -0.025** -0.039** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) 
Accrual -0.000 -0.005 -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
Competition -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
SalesGrowth -0.007* -0.010*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Capital 0.020 -0.015 0.042 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.053) 
MB 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution -0.009 -0.008 0.014 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) 
Nmarket -0.011** -0.012*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Analyst 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor 0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) 
Constant 0.067 0.080* 0.030 
 (0.049) (0.045) (0.066) 
    
    
Obs. 16,022 19,305 6,535 
R-squared 0.235 0.225 0.207 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Note: This table reports the results of the effect on CSR performance for each type of corporate governance reform: 
(1) board independence, (2) audit committee and auditor independence, and (3) separation of board chairman and 
CEO positions. Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the year that corporate governance reform became 
effective in a country and afterward, and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9 Comply-or-Explain vs. Rule-based Reform and CSR Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf  ENV_Perf  SOC_Perf  
Post -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Post × Rule 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
RD 0.119 0.074 0.164 
 (0.088) (0.103) (0.101) 
Leverage -0.037*** -0.011 -0.063*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Accrual -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Competition -0.010 -0.020 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) 
SalesGrowth -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital  -0.007 0.044 -0.059 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.043) 
MB 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Nmarket -0.005 0.002 -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Analyst 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor -0.001 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.069 0.041 0.098* 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) 
    
    
Obs. 20,293 20,293 20,293 
R-squared 0.225 0.174 0.182 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Note: This table reports the cross-sectional variation of corporate governance reforms on CSR performance based on 
a country’s reform approach. Rule is an indicator that equals 1 if a country adopts a rule-based reform approach and 
0 if a country adopts a comply-or-explain reform approach. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 10 CSR Awareness, Corporate Governance Reform, and CSR Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf  ENV_Perf  SOC_Perf  
Post 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.063*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Post × HI_Pubaware -0.081*** -0.094*** -0.068*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.023** 0.033*** 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
RD 0.133 0.089 0.176* 
 (0.089) (0.105) (0.103) 
Leverage -0.034*** -0.010 -0.059*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
Accrual -0.002 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Competition -0.010 -0.023 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) 
SalesGrowth -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital  -0.011 0.041 -0.062 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.044) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001* 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Nmarket 0.001 0.009* -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Analyst 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor 0.004 0.007 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.100** 0.061 0.139*** 
 (0.046) (0.054) (0.053) 
    
Obs. 19,434 19,434 19,434 
R-squared 0.227 0.177 0.182 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Note: This table reports the cross-sectional variation of the effect of corporate governance reform on CSR performance 
based on the level of a country’s public awareness of CSR issues. HI_Pubaware is an indicator variable which equals 
to one (zero) if the mean rank score of (1) the number of non-government organizations per million population and 
(2) total number of CSR reports issued by non-commercial organizations divided by millions in population for each 
country is above (below) the sample median in the same year.  All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 11 Stringency of Legal Environment, Corporate Governance Reform, and CSR Performance 
  (1) (2) 
Stringency of Legal Environment Investor Protection Regulatory Quality 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf  CSR_Perf 
Post 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Post × HI_InvPro 0.008*  
 (0.005)  
Post ×HI_RegQual  0.008** 
  (0.003) 
Size 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
RD 0.105 0.109 
 (0.088) (0.088) 
Leverage -0.036*** -0.035*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Accrual -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Competition -0.016 -0.018 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
SalesGrowth -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Capital  -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
MB 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Nmarket -0.010** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Analyst 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.080* 0.084* 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
   
Obs. 20,171 20,171 
R-squared 0.222 0.222 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Note: This table reports the results examining whether the effect of corporate governance reform on CSR performance 
varies with the stringency of the legal environment in a country. The country-level stringency of legal environment is 
proxied by country-level (1) investor protection index, measuring the strength of investor protection and obtained 
from “Doing Business Indicators” by the International Finance Corporation and World Bank and (2) regulatory quality 
index, which captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. To facilitate interpretation, in the empirical model, 
HI_InvPro is an indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the investor protection index is above (below) the sample 
median. Similarly, HI_RegQual is an indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the regulatory quality index is above 
(below) the sample median. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 Ownership, Corporate Governance Reform, and CSR Performance 
  (1) (2) 
Ownership  Institutional Ownership Insider Ownership 
Dependent Variable CSR_Perf CSR_Perf 
Post 0.016*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Post × HI_Institution  0.010***  
 (0.003)  
Post × HI_Insider   -0.021*** 
  (0.006) 
Size 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.031*** 0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
RD 0.106 0.106 
 (0.088) (0.088) 
Leverage -0.032*** -0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Accrual -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Competition -0.012 -0.017 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
SalesGrowth -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Capital  -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
MB 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Institution  -0.012* 
  (0.007) 
Nmarket -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Analyst 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Big4Auditor -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.073 0.082* 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
   
Obs. 20,293 20,293 
R-squared 0.223 0.223 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Note: This table reports the results examining whether the effect of corporate governance reforms on CSR performance 
varies with institutional ownership or insider ownership. HI_Institution is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) if 
the proportion of shares (end-of-year) held by all types of institutional investors of a firm, obtained from Capital IQ 
database, is greater (lower) than the median institutional ownership of all firms in the same industry. Similarly, 
HI_Insider is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the proportion of shares (end-of-year) held by the CEO, 
obtained from Capital IQ database, is greater (lower) than the median CEO ownership of all firms in the same industry. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13 Corporate Governance Reform, CSR Performance, and Future Financial Performance 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q (t+1) Tobin’s Q (t+1) 
Post  0.134*** 
  (0.042) 
Reform  0.370*** 
  (0.070) 
Reform × Post  -0.234*** 
  (0.047) 
CSR_Perf 0.104*** 0.164*** 
 (0.026) (0.063) 
CSR_Perf × Post  -0.047 
  (0.059) 
CSR_Perf × Reform  -0.227*** 
  (0.077) 
CSR_Perf × Reform × Post  0.255*** 
  (0.074) 
Size  -0.223*** -0.223*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Age -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
RD 0.519** 0.495** 
 (0.232) (0.232) 
Leverage -0.598*** -0.592*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
Accrual 0.148*** 0.153*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
Competition -0.265*** -0.268*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) 
SalesGrowth 0.083*** 0.086*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Capital  0.191 0.183 
 (0.131) (0.131) 
MB 0.089*** 0.089*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Institution 0.162*** 0.147*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Nmarket 0.060*** 0.054*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Analyst 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Big4Auditor 0.042*** 0.039** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 3.353*** 3.103*** 
 (0.081) (0.093) 
   
Obs. 16,779 16,779 
Country FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Note: This table reports the results of the moderating effect of corporate governance reforms on the relation between 
CSR performance and future financial performance, measured by Tobin’s Q of year t+1. CSR_Perf is measured as the 
average of the environmental performance and social performance scores in ASSET4. Post is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 starting the year in which corporate governance reform became effective in a country and 0 otherwise. 
Reform is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in a country that implemented corporate governance reform 
during our sample period and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
